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CHRISTOPHER S. BEACH

CONSERVATION AND LEGAL POLITICS:
THE STRUGGLE FOR PUBLIC WATER POW ER IN MAINE
1900-1923
The idea of public ownership and development of water
resources gained considerable momentum in early
twentieth-century Maine, first under Progressive Republican
Governor Bert M. Femald, and then again under Percival
P. Baxter. In this article Christopher S. Beach explores
critical turning points in M aine’s conservation history and
suggests reasons why state leaders failed to grasp the oppor
tunity to develop M aine’s water powers publicly. While
popular pressures may have influenced resource policies, they
could not altera deeper commitment to decentralized govern
ment and private power in the state. Baxter, having
generated impressive popular support, was frustrated by
powerful constitutional constraints and by the process of
legal politics.

D evelopm ent of water resources was a prim ary im petus for
the rise of the progressive conservation m ovem ent. In many
parts of the nation, conflicts betw een the different users o f water
resources - especially irrigators, navigators, and pow er produc
ers - created political opportunities for people who believed in
centralized planning and efficient utilization. In the West, the
federal governm ent retained control o f m ost o f the headw aters
areas that were the key to water planning, and the navigational
and flooding issues in the vast regions of the Mississippi Valley
also assured a continuing federal presence. In these circum 
stances, when political conflict generated interest in water,
conservationists had a ready-made base for experim ents in
federal executive stew ardship.1 T he situation was different in
New England.
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The legal history of Maine is punctuated by conflicts between various water users, such
as dam builders and log drivers. In the early twentieth century, these battles centered on
the issue of public vs. private hydroelectric power development.
Photo courtesy University of Maine Special Collections Department

W ith its m aritim e climate and relatively short, steep rivers,
natural conditions in New England vary substantially from those
in the arid West and the flat central regions. Irrigation and
navigation were not as im portant as hydropow er, so com peting
interests did n ot stim ulate extensive political conflict, fed eral or
state governm ents had never been a m ajor factor in resource
developm ent, and private control o f the region’s rivers and lakes
was not seriously challenged. W ater was a vital com ponent in
New E ngland’s developm ent as an industrial center, but typically
it did not provide the conditions which underlay the robust
conservation debates found elsewhere.2 Perhaps because o f
these circum stances, the politics o f conserv ing w ater resources
in New England has not been subjected to extensive historical
analysis.3
C onditions in Maine, however, were m ore conducive to
political controversy. At the beginning o f the Progressive
period, many o f M aine’s rivers and lakes were not yet fully
developed for hydropower. As the state’s potential for hydro
electric developm ent becam e clear after the turn o f the century,
conflicts involving traditional users like fish gatherers and lum 
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ber drivers, and the newer m anufacturers and resort operators,
stim ulated substantial interest in water issues. Yet the potential
role for M aine’s executive branch was limited. M aine’s resource
developm ent policies were designed to facilitate developm ent by
private capital supported by legislative action and judicial over
sight. Unlike the federal governm ent, the state retained too little
control over its resources to exert an executive presence. This
unique com bination o f circumstances - extensive political con
flict over water b u t no federal or state direction - makes
exam ination of Maine especially interesting for students o f
conservation history. Progressive conservationists in Maine
faced two obstacles: not only were the ideological objections to
the “gospel of efficiency” as deeply ro o ted in Maine as they were
across the nation, b u t the existing political distribution o f pow er
precluded a strong role for the state executive. Conservation
politics in Maine involved both ideological conflict and a struc
tural challenge to the com bined dom inance o f the legislature
and judiciary.
In a recent article, Richard Ju d d focuses on the ideological
aspects o f the conflict over water resources. H e argues that
conservation politics in Maine betw een 1890 and 1929 were
generated an d conditioned at the grass-roots level by conflict
betw een three interest groups: rural traditionalists, industrial
capitalists, and representatives o f the state’s tourist industry.1
His study, however, neglects a second aren a of conflict. W hen
M aine’s conservationists began advocating that the state replace
private capitalists as the prim ary developer o f M aine’s w ater
resources, they were also advocating expansion o f the executive
branch of governm ent. This challenge to the hegem ony o f the
legislature and judiciary could n o t be resolved solely through
ideological com prom ise. Conservationists had to thread their
way through a set of legal obstacles designed to circum scribe
political change. For this reason, it is im portant to exam ine how
M aine’s conservation debate was circum scribed by legal rhetoric
and legal m aneuvering.5
Briefly, the idea o f public ownership and developm ent o f
w ater resources gained considerable m om entum in Maine dur-
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ing the first decade o f the tw entieth century, b u t was d eterm ined
to be too radical by the legislature. C reation o f the Public
Utilities Com m ission in 1913 legitim ized the idea o f private
developm ent an d p u t an end, tem porarily, to the question of
public pow er developm ent. A second attem p t to establish public
control o f the state’s w ater resources gained even greater popu
larity betw een 1917 an d 1923. This tim e, however, conservation
ists, notably the popular G overnor Percival P. Baxter, ensnared
the idea in a challenge to the Judiciary Branch. Despite the
popularity o f this conservation ideal, legal “opinions” created
obstacles to executive stewardship th at could not be overcome.
W hen M aine’s legal guardians proved themselves m ore adept at
“legal politics’' than the state’s conservationists, the struggle for
public control o f w ater again failed.

WATER CONFLICT AND THE STRUCTURES OF
POWER, 1900-1913
After th ree centuries o f logging, M aine was no longer the
Pine T ree State: W ith its potential fo r industrial growth seem 
ingly locked in its “white gold,” its nicknam e should have b een
changed to the W ater State. Political conflict over the use of
M aine’s rivers and lakes was particularly intense during the first
decade of the new century. W ater transportation, in the form o f
log driving, was subordinated to m anufacturing and power, b u t
only after extensive and volatile political debate.6 A ccom m oda
tions betw een traditional users, m anufacturers, and the tourist
resort industry were also achieved only after widely publicized
political campaigns.7 T he developm ent o f hydroelectric genera
tion and transm ission technologies ad d ed a new overlay o f
controversy. A fter various capitalists from southern New En
gland tried repeatedly to capture M aine’s hydroelectric pow er
potential for their factories, conflict was constrained and all of
M aine’s interests jo in e d in enacting the so-called Fernald Law,
which pro h ib ited exporting electricity from the state.8
The initial stimulus for w ater conservation ideas in Maine
was the th reat posed by outside capitalists. In 1903, Boston
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W orried that new long-range electric
transmission technologies would allow
developers to use Maine resources in rival
industrial centers, conservationist Edward
P. Ricker lobbied for a law prohibiting the
export of hydroelectric power from the state.
POLAND CENTENNIAL (1895)

capitalists asked Portland consulting engineer Everett C. Jo rd an
to provide a list o f all water powers within 250 miles o f their city.
Sensitive to the im portance o f new long-distance electric trans
mission technologies, Jo rd an becam e “a good deal d istu rb ed ” by
the request, and feared that Maine would suffer “d ep o p u latio n ”
if its water powers were diverted to serve factories outside the
state. W hen the U.S. Geological Survey began studies o f M aine’s
rivers and pow er sites the next year, Jo rd an was even m ore
alarm ed. He contacted a prom inent resort operator, Poland
Springs’ Edward P. Ricker, and the two began garnering support
for water conservation measures in M aine.9
Like conservationists elsewhere, Jo rd an , Ricker, and other
Mainers they recruited into the nascent m ovem ent all believed
in the most efficient and most scientific utilization o f water
resources. Like m ost Progressive-era conservationists, they
endorsed the idea o f centralized political pow er.10 Convinced
that private capital was not capable o f achieving the highest levels
o f utilization, they advocated state control o f water resource
developm ent. Selling these ideas in M aine’s com plex political
m arketplace would not be easy. T he conservationists were
challenging both the dom inance o f private capital and the
constitutional distribution o f power that secured it.
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M aine’s political and legal system strongly favored eco
nom ic developm ent by private capital. T he R epublican party
had dom inated the state’s political process since the Civil W ar,
with ordinary political pow er centered in the legislature. D uring
this R epublican era, the legislature h ad transferred the state’s
forest lands and many o f its w ater powers to private capitalists.11
G overnors were generally d ep en d en t on party leadership and
were prevented from developing excessive pow er by their b rief
term s o f office. If the legislature seem ed to encroach too far into
the prerogatives o f private capital, the Maine Suprem e Judicial
C ourt stood ready to exercise extraordinary political pow er
through its control o f constitutional in terp retatio n .12 Centraliza
tion o f pow er in the executive, an d the developm ent o f b u reau 
cratic m eans to adm inister w ater resources, would entail signifi
cant changes in the structure o f M aine’s governm ent.
The conservationists were ju st getting organized when
M aine’s governm ental structure was challenged from an o th er
quarter. T he Maine State G range and other groups upset about
the corruption in enforcem ent o f the prohibition laws sought to
limit the legislature’s exclusive control over reform legislation.
After several years o f cam paigning, in 1907 they obtained an
am endm ent to the state constitution that perm itted direct p o p u 
lar initiation o f new legislation and direct popular referenda on
existing legislation. This change in the direction o f popular
dem ocracy would becom e an im portant feature o f M aine’s
conservation politics in ensuing decades. A sim ultaneous bid for
direct popular initiation o f constitutional am endm ents failed,
however. A majority in the legislature was p ersuaded th at the
“fundam ental law o f the State” should n o t be “subject...to the
passing th o u g h t o f the h o u r.”13 Thus the progressives were n o t
able to alter the ultim ate pow er o f the judiciary over constitu
tional m atters.14 T he authority to limit state intrusions upo n
private capital rem ained firmly entrenched in the judiciary,
through its pow er to in terp ret the constitution.
D uring these years, however, progressive ideas were in
creasingly popular, and in 1908 conservationists succeeded in
obtaining the nom ination and election o f one o f their own, Bert
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Governor Bert M. Fernald, elected on a
rising tide of progressive politics in Maine,
proposed a commission that would initiate
water power development “under ultimate
State ownership and control.”
University of Maine Special Collections
Department.

M. Fernald, with a great deal of support from the Ricker family.
W hen Fernald proposed a commission to devise plans for
developing M aine’s water powers "under ultim ate State ow ner
ship and control,” several years o f effort by conservationists
came to a head.15
Fernald’s decision to broach this idea was based on a
num ber o f political considerations. Conservation had becom e
popular nationally and locally. In Maine, as elsewhere, it was
fueled by popular resentm ent o f the corporations that dom i
nated the local economy. Textile, paper, and hydroelectric
developers had taken control of the state’s rivers and lakes. Yet
at the same time, Fernald had reason to believe he had the
support o f the state’s most dynamic resource-based corpora
tions. T he state’s two largest pulp and pap er corporations had
indicated they wanted m ore state involvement in developing
reservoirs. In addition, Fernald did not believe the State Suprem ejudicial C ourt would interfere on constitutional grounds.
In a recent advisory opinion written by C hief Justice Lucilius
Emery, the court had decided that the state could regulate
tim ber cutting w ithout “tak in g ' (or appropriating) vested rights,
and Fernald interpreted this to m ean that the court would not
object to state intervention in water developm ent.16
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In this reform context, the legislature approved F ernald’s
proposal fo r a State W ater Storage Com mission. Fernald
appointed himself, Jo rd an , Ricker, an d o th er p ro m in en t conser
vationists as com m issioners. They h ired engineer Cyrus Babb to
begin planning for the state to assum e developm ent o f its water
resources. Babb w rote a conservation m anifesto on the necessity
o f the state developing an d ow ning hydroelectric generating and
storage facilities, an d the com m issioners published it in 1910 as
p art o f their first report. A lthough the com m issioners asserted
that they did n o t wish to appear “too radical,77th eir recom m en
dation that the state undertake “regulation” o f all reservoirs
constituted a m ajor ideological shift.17
The political m om entum building towards refo rm then
swung quickly against M aine’s nascent conservation m ovem ent.
O pponents argued that radical proposals created political insta
bility and thus d eterre d capital from investing in the state.18
Given M aine’s biennial election process, conservationists were
not assured executive continuity. Fernald, in fact, was defeated
in 1910 and his successor, D em ocrat Frederick Plaisted, was no
friend o f the conservationists. He announced in 1911 that “o u r
w ater powers can only be m ade valuable by being developed by
private enterprise an d capital. The State will never, as a State,
develop a single w ater power, build a single storage dam, or erect
a single pow er station.”19 Instead of public power, Plaisted
recom m ended establishm ent o f a Public Utilities Com m ission
which could coordinate the activities of the state’s private utili
ties. The com m ission was form ed in 1913, absorbing F ernald’s
State W ater Storage Com m ission in the process. T he P.U.C.
facilitated the expansion o f the state’s private utility industry,
and the idea o f public pow er was b u ried in the process.20
T he changes in M aine’s political system betw een 1907 and
1913 were lim ited. T he people h ad obtained the pow er to
initiate and veto legislation, b u t n o t the pow er to overcom e
judicial decisions on m atters deem ed “constitutional.” This
would prove to be a substantial lim itation in future conservation
struggles. T he State W ater Storage Com m ission did n o t evolve
into an executive agency that controlled or o p erated water
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power facilities. Instead, the P.U.C. becam e an agency dedicated
to facilitating developm ent of the electric industry by private
capital. Conflict over the use of water resources created en o r
mous popular interest during these progressive years, b u t the
prim ary solution p roposed by conservationists had b een re
jected.
In the years im m ediately after establishm ent o f the P.U.C.,
the only group actively interested in state ownership of water
resources was the socialists. In every legislative session betw een
1913 and 1923 a docum ent known as “the Tracy Bill” was
introduced, referred to com m ittee, and b u ried with a recom 
m endation o f “O ught N ot to Pass.” The bill called for establish
m ent o f a “People's Rights and W ater Power C om m ission,”
which would assume control o f all rivers, lakes, pond, and
reservoirs, produce an d distribute electricity, and divide any
profits “annually p er capita to every m an, w om an and child who
are legal inhabitants o f the state.”21
W hile the Tracy Bill contained legal assertions contrary to
much o f the state’s w ater law, it did reflect a popular u n d erstan d 
ing that M aine’s water resources were “ow ned” by the public, and
could therefore be controlled and developed by public au th o r
ity. The belief had som e support in recent judicial opinions,
including a 1910 restatem ent of public rights in "great p o n d s”
written by the state’s m ost scholarly justice, A lbert Savage o f
A uburn.22 This belief in ultim ate public ow nership would
provide a popular base for the revival of the cam paign for public
power which began in 1917.

PERCIVAL BAXTER AND PUBLIC POWER, 1917-1923
T he revival of the conservation m ovem ent was carried out
largely through the efforts of a single individual: P o rtlan d ’s
Percival P. Baxter. Like Gifford Pinchot at the national level,
Baxter’s personal am bition and political preferences had an
overwhelming influence on the course o f the conservation
m ovem ent in Maine after 1917. W ithout Baxter, it is possible the
second campaign for public pow er would never have occurred.

158

A second public water power campaign was launched by Governor Percival P. Baxter in
1917. Baxter, who served intermittently in the Maine 1louse and Senate before becoming
governor in 1921, announced his willingness to do battle with the state's most powerful
industrial corporations.
Photo courtesy Earle Shellleworth, Maine Histone Preservation Commission.

His strategic decisions, his tendency to create confrontations to
generate popular support, and his personality were intimately
intertw ined with the popularization - and the ultim ate failure of
the second effort to establish public control o f the state’s water
resources.23
Percival Baxter learned to appreciate the forests and waters
o f inland Maine as a child during extended fishing and canoeing
trips with his father. He attended Bowdoin College and then
H arvard Law School, graduating in 1901. H e served in the Maine
H o u sein 1905 and in the Senate in 1909. He never practiced law,
bu t confined his professional life to m anaging his fath er’s
businesses, investm ents, and philanthropies.21 Reelected to the
Maine H ouse o f Representatives in 1916, Baxter was determ ined
to m ake conservation the centerpiece o f his political career.25
T he state’s largest landow ner and m anufacturing corpora
tion, the G reat N orthern Paper Com pany, had long since aban
d o n ed any desire to have the state involved in developing
reservoirs. It wanted to construct an enorm ous new dam on the
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Penobscot - “its river” - and came to the 1917 session of the
legislature expecting easy confirm ation of its right to flood
upriver lands owned by others. W hen the bill reached the Senate
floor for com m ittee assignment, Baxter tried to get it referred to
the Judiciary Com m ittee, arguing that the request involved a
m ajor issue of public control. A sserting that G reat N o rth ern
had, in effect, purchased the votes o f the 1903 legislature in
obtaining its original franchise rights on the river, Baxter gave
notice that he was willing to do public battle with the state’s m ost
powerful industrial corporation. T he proposal was defeated by
a wide m argin.26 His continued opposition to the bill, based on
claims that the p ap er com panies h ad effectively stolen their
tim berlands from the people o f Maine, was equally ineffective.
At this point, Baxter decided to salvage som e publicity advantage
by offering an am endm ent providing for reversion o f the flowage rights to the state at no com pensation, in the event that the
state reacquired control o f the river. W hen G reat N o rth ern
indicated no opposition to the am endm ent, believing that such
a state taking was extrem ely unlikely, Baxter described the
com pany as “fair and reasonable.”27 Baxter received valuable
experience and a good deal o f publicity from these events. G reat
N orthern, meanwhile, consolidated its hold on the largest pri
vately held w ater pow er system in the northeast an d p rep ared to
keep an eye on the mischievous new legislator.
W hen the legislative session ended, Baxter m o u n ted a
campaign to revive conservation ideas in Maine. T ouring the
state, he spoke to granges and o th er popular groups, focusing on
the fact that legislators had thw arted “the P eople’s Rights” by
delivering w ater resources into the hands o f the corporations.
He corresponded with o th er conservation activists, including
A rthur Staples, a lawyer who had written a series o f editorials in
the Lewiston Journal on water conservation.28 Baxter ap peared
at the Republican convention and introduced a “W ater Power
R esolution” calling for state assum ption of all water pow er and
storage sites.29
Baxter’s publicity cam paign quickly attracted the interest o f
the state’s largest m anufacturers and utilities, sixteen of which

160

Lucilius Emery (left), former Chiefjustice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, drafted
a long letter attacking the legal premises of Baxter’s proposals and sent it to Old-Guard
Republican William T. Cobb (right). Governor of Maine prior to Fernald’s administration.
Cobb was an ardent foe of progressives like Ricker and Baxter, and he saw that Emery’s
letter reached the public.
University of Maine Special Collections Department.

jo in e d together to hire a publicity agent for a countercam paign.
T he agent denounced Baxter and his fellow conservationists for
advocating “drastic and socialistic,” “wild,” and “ruthless” ideas
and for “d isco u rag in g ] the investment o f capital” by “th reaten 
ing the security o f the title o f owners o f w ater pow ers.”30 B axter’s
energetic campaigns and the corporations’ response quickly
revived popular interest in water power. T he issue becam e the
central conflict in Maine politics in the early 1920s.
Baxter’s cam paign also attracted the attention o f an o th er
M ainer, with a much longer history in public life. Lucilius Emery
was the form er chief justice of the M aine Suprem e Judicial
C ourt, a speaker and author on a wide variety o f legal subjects,
an inveterate w riter o f letters-to-the-editor on many topics, and
a professor at the state’s law school in Bangor. Born in 1840,
elected as a state senator and as a state attorney general in the
1870s, Emery was a long-time law p artn er with one o f M aine’s
m ost pro m in en t national senators. A ppointed to the Maine
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Suprem e Judicial C ourt in 1883, and serving as the state’s chief
justice from 1906 to 1911, Emery was approaching the en d o f a
long career devoted to public affairs.31 Any p ro n o u n cem en t he
chose to make on legal or constitutional m atters carried consid
erable weight.
Emery carefully followed Baxter’s revival o f water pow er
issues in the 1917 legislature. Baxter’s ideas on public ownership
were anathem a to Emery, who was firmly com m itted to the
ideology o f lim ited state intervention in econom ic developm ent.
O n March 10, 1917, he m ailed a long letter attacking the legal
foundation o f Baxter’s proposals to a p ro m in en t Republican,
William T. Cobb. In the letter, Emery set out an ingeniously
crafted legal argum ent. It would be unconstitutional for the state
to develop any water powers, he argued, because the takings
necessary for such developm ent would not be a “public use.”32
The party leadership decided that Em ery’s letter should be
published. To give the opinion the greatest weight possible, the
letter would appear in the form o f a special re p o rt issued by the
P.U.C. W ith some revision, the letter was presented to the public
in 1918 as “The Legal Phase o f the W ater Power Investigation,
By Lucilius A. Emery, Form er Chief Justice o f the Maine Su
prem e Judicial C ourt.”33
Baxter obtained a copy o f Em ery’s letter before its publica
tion and proceeded to make the biggest b lu n d er of his public
career. He did not seek to counter the legal conclusions stated
in the letter; nor is there any evidence in his private papers that
he sought the advice of m ore learned and politically savvy
lawyers than himself. Instead o f challenging Em ery’s interpreta
tion, he dashed off an “open letter” to G overnor Carl Milliken
with copies to all the state’s daily newspapers, declaring that
there was “grave doubt u n d er o u r C onstitution as to w hether the
State can condem n water powers and develop and distribute
electricity.” Baxter dem anded that the governor call a special
session o f the legislature to p repare a constitutional am endm ent
that would give “the State the pow er to condem n and take over
both the developed and undeveloped water powers and the great
storage reservoirs o f our Lakes and Rivers. ”3d
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B axter’s confrontational strategy played into the hands o f
the opposition. Before a constitutional am en d m en t could be
subm itted to a popular vote, it would have to be approved by a
two-thirds m ajority in each house o f the legislature. U nder the
state constitution, the H ouse or the Senate, n o t the people,
controlled constitutional am endm ents. Provoking a battle over
the constitution introduced a new elem ent into the public pow er
debate, one that significantly increased the obstacles to its
success.
D uring the 1919 session of the legislature, it becam e clear
that Baxter could not garner the necessary votes to hold a
constitutional referendum . Instead of backing away from the
problem , he com po u n d ed his initial mistake by insisting on a
constitutional confrontation. Instead of countering Emery’s
legal opinion, Baxter p roposed that the issue be subm itted for an
advisory opinion from the m em bers o f the M aine Suprem e
Judicial C o u rt.35
M aine’s advisory opinion procedure was an anom aly within
American judicial practice. W ith origins in medieval English
legal procedures established p rio r to principles o f separation of
judicial from executive and legislative powers, it had survived the
American Revolution because the early republicans feared ex
ecutive pow er m ore than judicial pow er.36 From the perspective
of the conservationists’ strategy, the m ost im p o rtan t feature o f
the p ro ced u re was that it did no t involve the adversarial presen
tations used in norm al litigation. N either Baxter, his fellow
conservation activists, n o r their corporate opponents had any
opportunity to present argum ents to the justices. F orm er Chief
Justice Lucilius Emery him self had argued in a 1908 law review
article that the pro ced u re was “undesirable” for two reasons: the
lack o f adversarial argum ent m eant a “greater liability to e rro r”
on the p art o f the justices, and the procedure o p en ed the court
to criticism for displaying “u n d u e sympathy with a class or some
powerful interest, o r with some political or econom ic dogm a.”37
Baxter h ad en tered a legal gam e that was stacked against
him. T he only “b r ie f ’ the justices h ad on the public pow er idea
was the opinion by their form er chief justice that h ad been
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published by the P.U.C. The justices adopted Emery's theory
that privately owned power sites could not be taken by em inent
dom ain because of the judicially created “public use" doctrine.
U nder their convoluted an d technologically dated interpreta
tion of the doctrine, the taking would constitute a “private use”
because m uch o f the electricity produced w ould be distributed
to “private” m anufacturers.38 In an unusually sarcastic passage,
they attacked the popular beliefs which underlay the political
support for public ownership:
T here seems to be som e m isapprehension as
to these so-called public rights in great ponds.
They are often spoken o f as if they were sacred
and inalienable. N ot so....They can be granted
and conveyed, as they often have been, by the
Legislature, which represents the people. W hat is
ow ned by the people may be transferred by the
Legislature, unless prohibited by the C onstitu
tion, and no such constitutional inhibition barri
cades the way here. So m uch for public rights in
great ponds.39
C ontrol of water resources in Maine, according to the
justices, was a one-way m atter. The state could give water rights
to private capitalists; once given, the state could not take them
back. The public's “ow nership” o f the great ponds was rendered
valueless. The great ponds could be dam m ed up and used for the
production o f pow er by private capital; the state could not even
impose taxes for their use as reservoirs, m uch less enter the
business o f producing o r distributing electricity. T he opinion
was a resounding victory for the advocates of private control of
M aine’s water resources.
While events in the legal arena were shaping the term s o f
the struggle, the conservationists were having m ore success in
the m ore ordinary political arena. Before the justices’ opinion
was issued, conservationists h ad succeeded in reviving the old
State W ater Storage Com mission as an agency separate from the
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P.U.C., this time calling it the Maine W ater Power Commission.
Edward Ricker, by this time the second m ost p ro m in en t conser
vation activist in the state, was ap p o in ted chairm an. T he new
com mission was authorized to rep o rt on w hether w ater re
sources should be “acquired and developed by the state o r by
private enterprise.” T he com m ission was also directed to d eter
m ine "what rights rem ain to the state in the storage reservoirs
and basins and in the developed and undeveloped w ater pow
ers.” In short, it was to study the legal status of state control of
w ater resources.40
By the tim e the new com m ission was organized and issued
its first rep o rt in 1920, however, it was too late. T he justices had
already published their opinion that it was unconstitutional for
the state to store, produce, or distribute power. T he com m ission
tried to counter the justices with its own legal argum ents, citing
num erous precedents from o th er states, quoting a lengthy 1915
decision by U nited States Suprem e C ourt Justice Oliver W endell
Holmes, and concluding that “the construction o f storage reser
voirs by the State...is essentially and in fact a public use.” Yet, the
com mission stated, it was “useless” to present proposals to the
legislature given “the attitude o f the Maine courts.’M1 The
com m issioners were correct: While the justices’ advisory opin
ion did n o t possess the technical status o f final law, it was highly
unlikely that the sitting justices would change their opinion in
any litigation that m ight result from reform legislation.
The only practical course left for the activists at this p o in t
was to overturn the opinion by am ending the state constitution.
They were busy prom oting possible am endm ents when events
seem ed to tu rn their way.12 W hen G overnor Frederick H.
Parkhurst died unexpectedly on January 31, 1921, Percival
Baxter, then president of the Maine Senate, becam e governor.13
T he prospects for overcom ing the legal im broglio looked p rom 
ising. Yet B axter’s confrontational leadership style precluded a
reconciliation betw een the executive and judicial branches.
O ne o f B axter’s first steps as governor was to fire the
longtim e chairm an o f the P.U.C., Benjam in Cleaves, allegedly
for acting as a paid lobbyist for the utilities.44 Baxter also led
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Governor Baxter (in silk hat) tours through Belfast, October 18, 1921.
Photo courtesy Earle Shettleworth, Maine Historic Preservation Commission

efforts to elim inate state funding for the Law School in Bangor,
an institution that had been a pet project and propaganda base
for Lucilius Emery. Rather than work quietly behind the scenes
to persuade the opposition that the state storage idea had real
merit, Baxter continued to present his positions in the form of
open letters, proclam ations, pam phlets, and o th er public propa
ganda. T he constitutional am endm ent he subm itted to the
legislature in March 1921 gave the state m uch b ro ad er authority
than the developm ent o f storage reservoirs and taxation of water
powers, increasing suspicions about his real intentions. After
extensive and acrim onious debates, the proposed am endm ent
was soundly defeated in both houses.15
Ironically, Baxter’s failure in the legislature seem ed to add
to his stature as a popular politician. H e was able to secure his
party’s gubernatorial nom ination and obtained a resounding
victory in the next election. While part o f his popular political
success can be attributed to his fiscal conservatism, it was also
due to his stand against “the octopus,” especially on the water
power issue. His election as governor in 1922 was the closest
thing to a popular m andate for public pow er the conservationists
would ever achieve.
Baxter opened the 1923 session with a conciliatory offer on
water resource developm ent. He would no longer seek to tax
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w ater powers; n o r would he advocate a central pow er grid
developed and operated by the state. All he w anted was an
am endm ent to the constitution allowing state developm ent of
storage reservoirs.16 This lim ited proposal was soon b uried
within a related controversy. Seven o f the state’s largest m anu
facturing and utility corporations subm itted a bill that would
give them the developm ent rights to a m ajor reservoir site: a
portion o f the Dead River near Bigelow M ountain. W hen the bill
received approval, Baxter vetoed it because he w anted the site
developed by the state instead. His veto was overridden by a wide
margin. Baxter responded with an em otional public proclam a
tion denouncing the bill, the corporations and their lobbyists,
the P.U.C., the legislature, and the opposition newspapers. He
then called for the citizens of M aine to initiate legislation
repealing the bill.'17 In the context o f this acrim onious contro
versy, B axter’s proposed constitutional am endm ent on storage
was trounced in the legislature.18 Baxter could get popular
support on ordinary legislation like the reservoir bill u n d er the
initiative and referendum procedures of the state constitution,
bu t he could not get past the legislature with an am endm ent
which would allow the state to develop that same reservoir in its
own right.
T he corporations initiated a counter-referendum . Facing
com plete defeat, Baxter then p ro p o sed a com prom ise in which
the state would lease the reservoir site to the corporations for a
minimal rental fee. The offer was accepted, and bo th referen
dum campaigns were halted. The corporations then repudiated
the deal by refusing to develop the site. By this time, any
m om entum in B axter’s favor had dissipated.49 The vision o f state
control o f water resources had collapsed.

CONCLUSIONS
Percival B axter’s opponents did n o t forget this public
pow er campaign. W hen Baxter sought his party’s nom ination as
U nited States senator in 1926, the sam e interests led the fight to
stop him. As he saw the nom ination slipping from his grasp,
Baxter reflected on his past mistakes. T he real tu rn in g p oint in
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his career, he felt, was the unsuccessful confrontation he had
provoked with the state’s judiciary back in 1919. Jo ttin g a note
to him self on the back o f an envelope, Baxter wrote: “H ad it not
been for the out-of-date opinions o f the Maine Suprem e Court,
a court that looked backward and not forward, a court too m uch
influenced by the business interests o f the State, n o t personally
interested b u t im pressed by them , I would have won. The people
were with m e.”50
Was Baxter Correct? Could the goal o f public control o f
M aine’s w ater powers have been achieved, h ad it n o t been
preconditioned in a legal arena? Certainly he was correct in
asserting that “the people” were with him; he had been one o f the
most popular governors ever elected in Maine, an d his popular
ity was due in large part to his attem pt to wrest control o f the
state’s m ost im portant natural resource from “the octopus.”
While one could argue that the Maine Suprem e C ourt would
have declared such legislation unconstitutional anyway, this is
somewhat speculative. As the State W ater Power Commission
pointed out in its belated legal brief, by 1917 there was ample
precedent for governm ent involvement in pow er projects at
both the federal and state levels, and this preced en t would
certainly have been presented to thejustices in a truly adversarial
proceeding. The Maine court had previously w ritten that the
state "ow ned” the state’s lakes, and conceivably it might have
been am enable to contem porary reasoning o f judges elsewhere
on the public pow er issue. Further, the opposition was not
fundam entally opposed to the kind o f centralized pow er system
envisioned by the conservationists. Early in 1921, before Baxter
had engaged too many o f his public confrontations, the presi
dent o f the Central Maine Power Com pany had adm itted pri
vately that the only real difference betw een public and private
control o f hydroelectric developm ent concerned the selection if
its m anagem ent.51 In these circumstances, it is possible that a
majority in the legislature could have enacted the necessary
legislation for some form o f public power.
T he traditional distribution o f political pow er in Maine did
not favor the establishm ent o f executive stewardship of water
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resources. Conservationists like Jo rd an , Ricker, Fernald, Babb,
and Baxter faced difficult structural problem s in their efforts to
im port water conservation ideas into Maine. In his study o f
grass-roots conservation politics in Maine, Richard Ju d d argues
that the state’s rural majority actively participated in creating the
m ore lim ited kinds o f conservation program s that were enacted,
and in vetoing perceived corporate excesses through the refer
endum pow er.52 This study suggests that while popular m ajori
ties in Maine may have influenced ordinary resource policies,
their influence did n o t change a deeper com m itm ent to decen
tralized governm ent an d private pow er in the state. Popular
influence could be contained within m ore powerful constitu
tional limits by the processes o f legal politics.
Baxter s political failure dem onstrates the difference be
tween conservation politics in the East and in the West. T he
great achievements in Am erican conservation - the national
parks, federal forest preserves, and large-scale irrigation projects
- took place at least initially in the West, w here lands were still
largely in the federal dom ain. In this new land, people with
political resolve, like Frederick Newlands an d Gifford Pinchot,
could carve out vast changes in the concept o f public responsi
bility for resource developm ent. Eastern conservationists, with
equally innovative ideas and the ability to excite the popular
im agination, faced a m uch m ore daunting challenge. As B axter’s
frustrating conservation story suggests, political tact and legal
acum en were the keys to conservation politics where vested
interests were strong and legal and political structures m olded by
centuries of private resource exploitation. A lthough A m erica’s
conservation ideas were form ulated by easterners to a large
degree, the great stage for their im plem entation would be in the
West.
A bust o f Percival Baxter is now the centerpiece in the
ro tu n d a of M aine’s statehouse. O n contem porary highway
maps, a patch of green su rro u n d ed by a white background marks
the m agnificent park he acquired and d o n ated to the public. A
m o n u m en t to Baxter’s public spiritedness, this patch of green
also accentuates the overwhelm ing dom inance of private land

169

PUBLIC WATER POWER

holding surrounding it. The state’s rivers and lakes continue to
produce pow er u n d er the control o f its private p ap er and utility
corporations. Percival Baxter was M aine’s quintessential “public
m an,” but after the failure o f his water conservation campaign,
he com pleted his life’s work - Baxter State Park - in a very private
way in a very private state: he personally bought up parcels of
land from private tim ber com panies and don ated them , piece
meal, to the state.
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